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CULPABLE INTERVENTION AS SUPERSEDING CAUSE *
LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE t
In dealing with questions of legal cause, or "proximate cause" as the
cases generally say, the courts are confronted with two quite separate prob-
lems. The first involves primarily a question of fact and the application of
physical laws to determine the answer. To a certain extent this process is
scientific. The chain of events which stretches from the defendant's breach
of duty (to the plaintiff) to the harm suffered by the plaintiff, is examined
in the light of the laws of physics to determine whether there is an uninter-
rupted sequence of causes and effects. The determination of this question
is for the trier of fact, except in those cases in which the facts and the infer-
ences to be drawn from them are such as to exclude any reasonable difference
of opinion. But in the great majority of cases there is no ground for a
reasonable difference of opinion on this first question. No court would per-
mit a jury to find that a careless motorist who struck an unnoticed pedestrian
at a crosswalk did not cause the fractured tibia which immediately followed
the impact. The causal relation is clear and the problem merely factual. So
too, where it is clear that the plaintiff would have suffered the same harm
even though there had been no breach of duty by the defendant, the court
would not permit the jury to find that the breach of duty caused the harm.1
In the determination of the first factual question the data must indicate, at
least, that the defendant's conduct was a causa sine qua non. But while this
* A considerable portion of the material contained in this article is taken from the author's
PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS to the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. These annotations are copy-
righted by the American Law Institute, and the material is reproduced here with the permis-
sion of the publisher.
t B. S., z924, Lafayette College; LL. B., 1927, University of Pennsylvania; Adviser, RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS (1934) ; member of the Philadelphia Bar; Associate in Law, University
of Pennsylvania; author of RESTATEMENT, TORTS, PA. ANNoT. (x938) ; Landlord's Tort Lia-
bility for Disrepair (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 467.
I. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 432. In one situation only is a different result reached,
i. e., where there are two concurrent active forces each of which is alone sufficient to bring
about harm to the plaintiff.
(121)
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much is the minimum requirement, it may not be sufficient. Here enters the
necessity, in the occasional case, for the trier of fact to exercise a degree of
judgment in evaluating and weighing the facts. Although it is found as a
fact that the plaintiff's harm would not have occurred but for the defend-
ant's breach of duty to him, other causes which also contributed may have
been so powerful or numerous, or both, that normal people studying the data
would not consider the defendant's conduct to be a real substantial cause.
Thus, in determining the first question the trier of fact must examine the
data and ask, Was the defendant's conduct a "substantial factor" in produc-
ing the plaintiff's harm? This term, which was used by Professor Jeremiah
Smith, 2 has been adopted in the Restatement with the explanation, "The
word 'substantial' is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has
such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it
as a cause, using that word in the popular sense in which there always lurks
the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called 'philosophic sense',
which includes every one of the great number of events without which any
happening would not have occurred. Each of these events is a cause in the
so-called 'philosophic sense', yet the effect of many of them is so insignifi-
cant that no ordinary mind would think of them as causes." 3
But it should be empashized that in answering this question the trier
of fact is concerned entirely with ascertaining the facts by tracing the chain
of cause and effect, just as a student of physics would follow the trail of a
force he started in motion. It should also be emphasized that usually the
causal relationship is clear. \Only occasionally is there room for a differ-
ence of opinion as to whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial
factor. In those occasional cases the trier of fact goes one step beyond ob-
serving the data as to cause and recording the result of his observation, and
exercises a judgment in determining the "substantial factor" question.
The second problem which must be dealt with in determining whether
the defendant's conduct is the legal cause of the plaintiff's harm is entirely
different. It does not relate to the finding of the physical facts and their
causal interrelation at all. It involves the quite separate and far more deli-
cate question of how far society should go in requiring the defendant to pay
for damages which his conduct has in fact been a substantial factor in pro-
ducing. This is primarily a question of substantive law.4 The proper solu-
tion calls for minds trained in the working out of rules of law which will
reduce social friction to a minimum. It requires a trained and comprehensive
sense of judgment. And because even trained and experienced judges may
2. SMITH, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort in SELEcTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF ToRTs
(1924) 649, 711.
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (934) § 431, comment a.
4. Id. at § 453.
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differ on delicate social problems, much of the law relating to legal cause is
beset with confusion and conflicting decisions. All too frequently the lan-
guage of opinions serves only to obscure the real problem by discussing the
two separate questions as one, and that a mere question of fact. Nor is
clarity attained by the repetitious utterance of a ritualistic formula about
"natural and probable consequences". But the proper determination of the
case is aided by asking first, Can the jury (or other trier of fact) properly
find as a fact that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in pro-
ducing the plaintiff's harm? If the answer is no, that ends the plaintiff's
case. If the answer is yes, the second question is, Is there any sound social
reason why the plaintiff should nonetheless not have and hold his verdict?
As the answer to the second question calls for an intuitive judgment, com-
plete predictability of the answer of a court is impossible. During the past
century, however, the courts in dealing with this second question have evolved
certain rules of law which show definite trends. Cases involving the extent to
which an intervening force 5 constitutes a superseding cause 6 are numerous.
Intervening forces which consist of intervening human action have especially
troubled the courts.
Assume, for example, that a municipal corporation, charged with a duty
of maintaining a highway in a condition safe for travel, permits a defect to
exist therein which constitutes a danger to travelers. A person driving a
vehicle strikes this defect, loses control, and runs into a nearby pedestrian.
That is a simple statement of the factual data. Considering the question of
cause as a factual one, reasonable minds could well infer that the highway
defect was a substantial factor in producing the harm to the pedestrian.
When a court desires to know in addition whether the intervening actor
acted innocently, or negligently, or wilfully, in order to determine the munici-
pality's liability, the court is not concerned with this first question of causa-
tion at all. The actual chain of cause and effect in the eyes of the physicist
cannot be affected by the mental state of the intervener. The play of forces
in response to the operation of natural laws is not affected by whether an
actor's conduct is to be denominated as innocent or tortious. What the court
is concerned with in determining whether intervening human acts constitute
a superseding cause is some rule of law which restricts liability short of re-
quiring the defendant to pay for all the harm caused by his breach of a duty.
7
Such a restrictive rule must be based upon some inarticulate or expressed no-
5. "An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing harm to another
after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed." Id. at § 441 (1).
6. "A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its interven-
tion prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence
is a substantial factor in bringing about." Id. at § 44o.
7. x BErv, NEGLIGENCE iNT LAW (3d ed. 19o8) 53. Note that Beven discusses Causal
Connection under a separate heading at p. 82. The same point has been stressed by BOHLEN,
STtmIs IN THE LAW or ToRTs (1926) 504.
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tion of policy which motivates the court's action. Here, as in so many other
places in the law of torts, there has been a great change in the attitude of
the courts since i8oo.
In the beginning of the 19th century innocent intervening human action
did not ordinarily act as a superseding cause. But at about that time the
"last human wrongdoer" rule came into existence. Text writers generally
point to the nisi prius decision in Vicars v. Wilcocks,s a slander case, as the
origin of this doctrine. Briefly stated, the rule was that if after the defend-
ant's wrongful conduct there intervened the wrongful (culpable) act of a
third person, the latter relieved the defendant from liability, and "the last
human wrongdoer" was solely responsible for the plaintiff's harm. As Beven
and Bohlen have pointed out,9 this is really not a question of causation, but
a rule of restrictive liability, quite apart from the question of causation.
However, the courts, without distinguishing the two questions, have gen-
erally approached the last human wrongdoer rule as a part of the law of
causation. Actually the rule indicated a belief on the part of the court that
if the plaintiff had someone against whom he could get a judgment he should
be satisfied. Further, it was generally easy of application and gave a desir-
able certainty to the law.
However, this rule soon began to crumble as it was artificial and often
led to socially undesirable results. The fact that a second human wrongdoer
has intervened and participated in causing harm to the plaintiff justifies a
rule which permits a recovery against him, but it is difficult to understand
why it should exculpate from liability the first wrongdoer, who has also
participated in causing the harm. 10
In i886, when Sir Frederick Pollock came to write the first edition of
his treatise on torts, he had this to say of the rule of Vicars v. Wilcocks:
"But this doctrine is contrary to principle: The question is not whether C.'s
8. 8 East I (K B. i8o6).
9. See BoHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 205.
io. As early as i86I, in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577 (I86I), the doctrine of
Vicars v. Wilcocks was strongly criticized. In Burrows v. March Gas & Coke Co., L. R. 7
Ex. 96 (1872), the court of Exchequer Chamber held that the intervening negligence of a
person who carried a lighted candle into a gas-filled shop did not relieve the defendant from
liability for harm to the plaintiff produced by the explosion. In Clark v. Chambers, L. R.
3 Q. B. D. 327 (1878), the defendant set up a chevaux de frise across a highway for the pur-
pose of preventing vehicles from getting to his grounds where athletic sports were carried
on. An opening was left in this barrier. Some unknown person came along and removed
one of the barriers from the place where it had stood and placed it in an upright position in
the footpath. The plaintiff, coming along in the dark, ran into the obstruction which had
been placed on the footpath by the unknown third person, and lost his eye. The court per-
mitted a recovery against the defendant, taking the position that even though the act of plac-
ing the barrier on the footpath was the intervening negligent act of a third person, this would
not relieve the defendant from liability. In his opinion Chief Justice Cockburn reviews the
English authorities, in particular, at p. 335, quoting from justice Brett's statement in Collins
v. Middle Level Comm'rs, L. R. 4 C. P. 279, 288 (1869) : ". . . the primary and substantial
cause of the injury was the negligence of the defendants; and it is not competent to them to
say that they are absolved from the consequences of their wrongful act by what the plaintiff
or someone else did."
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[intervener] act was lawful or unlawful, but whether it might have been in
fact reasonably expected to result from the original act of A. [defendant].
And, though not directly overruled, it has been disapproved by so much and
such weighty authority that we may say it is not law." 11
In the meantime the American cases were similarly getting farther and
farther away from the last human wrongdoer rule. In the leading case of
Lane v. Atlantic Works"2 the court held that intervening negligent human
conduct did not relieve the defendant from liability where such intervention
ought to have been foreseen. It is not proposed to review here the American
cases, as that has already been done by various writers. Suffice it to say that
the decided modem trend of authority, both in England and America, has
been to make the liability of the defendant turn upon whether the interven-
ing human action was foreseeable and to hold the defendant liable where in
the retrospect the intervening act did not appear to be particularly unusual
or extraordinary. The imposing list of writers who have studied the prob-
lem have uniformly urged that the defendant be held liable for harm caused
by foreseeable human intervention, regardless of whether it be innocent, neg-
ligent, or even criminal. 13
Professor Bohlen has said, "The decided though perhaps not unanimous
tendency of modem authority is to make the liability of the original actor de-
pend not upon the negligence or even intentional wrongfulness of the subse-
quent act of a third party, which is the final decisive cause of the plaintiff's
harm, and so upon the legal culpability of such act, but rather upon this,--
whether or not, in view of the surrounding circumstances, and the conditions
which the defendant's conduct may be expected to create, the third party's
subsequent action was normal, and so, expectable. . . . There is normally
no reason to anticipate wilful wrongdoing of others, but this bears only on
the question as to whether the act is expectable or not. In exceptional situa-
tions even wilfully wrongful acts of others are normal and expectable." 14
ii. PoLnocx, TORTS (Am. ed. 1887) 161-i62. The same statement appears down to and
including the 12th edition, published in 1923. In the 13th edition (1929), at p. 246, the words
"was or was not in a continuous or 'direct' line of consequence" have been substituted for
"might have been in fact reasonably expected to result". The author explains that this
change is the result of the decision in Polemis' Case, [1921] 3 Y. B. 56o.
Subsequently, in Marshall v. Caledonian Ry., I Sess. Cas. (5TH SM.) io6o (I899), the
court held that intervening criminal conduct did not relieve the defendant from liability where
such conduct could have been foreseen and the defendant's action created the opportunity for
the criminal to enter and steal the goods.
12. 111 Mass. x36 (1872).
13. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act (1920) 33 HAgv. L. REV. 633, 644,
646, 65o; Bingham, "Legal Cause" at Common Law (igog) 9 COL. L. REV. 16, 136, 154;
Bohlen, The Probable or Natural Consequences as the Test of Liability in Negligence (19Ol)
49 U. OF PA. L. REV. 79, 86; Edgerton, Legal Cause (1924) 72 U. oF PA. L. REV. 211, 343,
374; McLaughlin, Proximate Cause (1925) 39 HARv. L. REV. 149, 178-183; Smith, Legal
Cause in Actions of Tort (1912) 25 HARv. L. REV. 103, 118-125. See also Note (1928) 76 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 720, 725.
14. Bo E , STUDIES IN THE LAW OF ToRTs (1926) 504-505. He also says, at p. 335,
n. go: "The view that no one need foresee the misconduct of another, announced in Vicars v.
Wilcocks, 8 East I (i8o6), has long since given place to the modem conception that every-
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This view has been accepted by the American Law Institute in its statement
that culpable human intervention is not a superseding cause unless it is in
reality extraordinary. 15
Developments in Pennsylvania
In view of the foregoing, the cases in Pennsylvania present an interest-
ing though confusing source of study. Within the past few years a line of de-
cisions has come down which constitutes a startling revival of the generally
discarded doctrine of Vicars v. Wilcocks.16 This line of cases is all the more
surprising in that it is based upon a statement by Wharton which was not ac-
cepted as good law in Pennsylvania during the half century which followed
its first appearance. In his treatise on negligence he said: "Supposing that if
it had not been for the intervention of a responsible third party the defend-
ant's negligence would have produced no damage to the plaintiff, is the de-
fendant liable to the plaintiff ? This question must be answered in the negative,
for the general reason that causal connection between negligence and damage
is broken by the interposition of independent responsible human action. I am
negligent on a particular subject matter. Another person, moving inde-
pendently, comes in, and either negligently or maliciously so acts as to make
my negligence injurious to a third person. If so, the person so intervening
acts as a non-conductor, and insulates my negligence, so that I cannot be sued
for the mischief which the person so intervening directly produces." 17
Wharton's statement is clearly the last human wrongdoer rule of Vicars
v. Wilcocks. As has already been pointed out, this case had been repudiated
in England prior to 1874, and the general doctrine of the case had been very
much whittled down in both England and America before that time and has
since then been substantially repudiated in America, except in cases where
the intervening negligent act is looked upon as extraordinary or the act is
done in an extraordinarily negligent manner, e. g., reckless conduct. Indeed,
for many years the Pennsylvania courts have generally held that not even in-
thing, which is, in fact, likely to occur, is legally foreseeable." More recently Professor
Bohlen has written: "The earlier of two wrongdoers, even though his wrong has merely set
the stage on which the later wrongdoer acts to the plaintiff's injury, is in most jurisdictions
no longer relieved from responsibility merely because the later act of the other wrongdoer
has been a means by which his own misconduct was made harmful. The test has come to be
whether the later act, which realized the harmful potentialities of the situation created by the
defendant, was itself foreseeable." Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (1937) 5o HARv. L. REV.
1225, 1229.
15. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§447-449.
i6. There have been occasional similar revivals of this doctrine, as for example in Single-
ton Abbey v. Paludina, [19271 i A. C. I6. This particular decision has been trenchantly
criticized in a Note (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 72o.
17. WHARTO, NEGLIGENCE (ist ed. 1874) § 134. Courts which have quoted this passage
generally overlook Wharton's further statement, at § 145: "if such subsequent negligence was
likely, in the usual and natural order of things, to follow from the defendant's negligence",
the latter is not relieved of liability. However, Wharton's book clearly indicates that he is
viewing what is "likely" from roseate Utopian heights, where men are never, or hardly ever,
negligent, and never, never intentionally bad.
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dependent intervening forces 18 are superseding causes, except in those cases
in which the court looked upon the operation of the force as extraordinary."9
When Wharton wrote his book, the modem law relating to actions based
on negligence was in its infancy. Not for another thirteen years was the
first edition of Pollock on Torts to appear, with its famous prefatory letter
to Justice Holmes, saying, "the purpose of this book is to show that there
really is a Law of Torts", and "The contention is certainly not superfluous,
for it seems opposed to the weight of recent opinion among those who have
fairly faced the problem". 20 The conceptual approach to tort cases which
characterized the 19th century was still supreme. The courts had not yet
drawn clear lines of distinction between the negligence issue (including neg-
ligence qua the plaintiff) and the cause issue. Wharton's entire chapter on
"Causal Connection" shows an almost constant confusion of these two quite
separate elements of a negligence action. Modem tort law and the 20th
century functional approach to its problems had not yet come into being.2 '
Burrell Twp. v. Uncapher,22 the first case in which the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania specifically considered the legal effect of a true independent
intervening negligent act by a human being, appeared in 1887, thirteen years
after Wharton's book. In that case the township had negligently allowed the
highway to remain in a dangerous condition by failing to guard a precipitous
drop at the roadside. A third person negligently left a steam roller at the
roadside, and it can be assumed that he had actual knowledge of the town-
ship's negligence since the unguarded precipice was in full view. Thereafter
a second independent force intervened: a horse, pulling the plaintiff's car-
riage, took fright at the steam roller and ran over the bank. The appeal
squarely presented to the court the question of whether the negligent inter-
vening act was a superseding cause. The court said: "Thus in Shearman &
Redfern on Negligence, 4O1, it is said: 'As a general principle, the fact that
an injury to a traveler on a highway was caused by the combined effect of
the unsafe condition of the road and the negligence of a third person, is no
defense to the party who is bound to keep the highway in repair'." 23 This
18. "A dependent, intervening force is one which operates in response to or is a reaction
to the stimulus of a situation for which the actor has made himself responsible by his neg-
ligent conduct. An independent force is one the operation of which is not stimulated by a
situation created by the actor's conduct. An act of a human being or animal is an indepen-
dent force if the situation created by the actor has not influenced the doing of the act." RE-
STATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 441, comment c.
ig. See cases listed in RESTATEMENT, TORTs, PA. ANNo. (1938) § 442.
2o. POLLOcK, TORTS (Am. ed. 1887) vi.
21. Indeed, a comparison of this early treatise on negligence with the RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS reveals a complete contrariety of statement as to many different rules of law. Whar-
ton, for example, at § 15o, cites with approval Pennsylvania P- P- v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 353 (1870),
as representing the Pennsylvania law of causation, and this case has been repudiated on its
facts by an unbroken line of subsequent Pennsylvania authority. For complete citation of
cases see RESTATEMENT, TORTS, PA. ANNOT. (1938) § 441.
22. 117 Pa. 353, II Atl. 619 (1897).
23. Id. at 363, II Atl. at 620.
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case has been so frequently cited as to be practically a leading case. It was
followed by Koelsch v. Philadelphia Co.,24 in which the defendant was neg-
ligent in permitting its gas main to fall into disrepair, with a resultant leak-
age of gas into the plaintiff's cellar. With knowledge of the presence of the
gas, a third person went into the cellar and negligently lighted a match, caus-
ing an explosion and harming the plaintiff. The defendant, on appeal, ar-
gued that the intervening negligence was a superseding cause. In holding to
the contrary the court said, "The concurrence of the presence of the gas and
the lighting of the match, the negligence of the defendant with that of Wal-
ters, was necessary to and did cause the explosion. In such cases the injured
party has his redress against either of the wrongdoers, or both .... ., 25
In Trusty v. Patterson '6 the defendant rented a car with defective
brakes to a bailee. The defect was known both to the defendant and to the
bailee. The latter negligently drove the car and, when the brakes failed to
hold, struck the plaintiff. Here again a person with knowledge of the de-
fendant's negligence committed an act of intervening negligence, but the
court permitted recovery without specifically discussing whether an inter-
vening negligent act is a superseding cause.
The foregoing cases are definitely contra to Wharton's statement quoted
above, and similar views were expressed in Wassel v. Ludwig.
2 7
Such was the state of the authorities in Pennsylvania when Stone v.
Philadelphia 28 was decided. According to the original record there was a
hole in a street beside a trolley track, caused by the sinking of the paving,
four or five inches deep, several inches wide, and running "for about four
house fronts". It had existed for months. A person driving an automobile
struck the hole, lost control of his car, and ran into the plaintiff, who was
standing behind an ice wagon. The motorist testified, "I wanted to avoid
this treacherous track which I knew was bad . . . I didn't know I would
get caught. I thought I would get over the rut. . . . When I couldn't
get out I applied the brakes." The city's appeal from a judgment against
24. 152 Pa. 355, 25 Atl. 522 (1893).
25. Id. at 364, 25 Atl. at 524. Wharton sets forth at § 146 the very factual situation
which existed in the Koelsch case, and says: "But if B. has notice, or is bound to take notice,
of the leakage, then B., in lighting the match in the cellar, is guilty of negligence, which
breaks the causal connection between A.'s negligence in causing the leak and the explosion."
It is clear that the Koelsch case is flatly contra to the view announced by Wharton.
26. 299 Pa. 469, 149 Atl. 717 (1930).
27. 92 Pa. Super. 341 (1928). On the other hand, in South-Side Ry. v. Trich, I17 Pa.
390, II Atl. 627 (1887), it was held that the active negligence of a horse car driver who
started the car before the plaintiff had an opportunity to get safely on, causing her to fall off
into the street, where she was immediately run over by a runaway horse, was not the legal
cause of her injuries. It is at least doubtful that this case can be considered good law today.
Cf. Frankel v. Norris, 252 Pa. 14, 97 Atl. 1O4 (I916), and Smith v. Yellow Cab Co., 285 Pa.
229, 132 Atl. 124 (1926), in both of which cases the defendant was actively negligent, as in the
Trich case, and where the court said that even intervening negligent human acts would not
relieve the defendant from liability. Indeed, O'Malley v. Laurel Line Bus Co., 311 Pa. 251,
166 Atl. 868 (I933), appears on its facts to be directly contra to the Trich case.
28. 302 Pa. 340, 153 Atl. 550 (1931).
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it raised no question of legal causation. Consequently the court did not have
the benefit of briefs or argument on this question. It was held that the mo.
torist's intervening negligence relieved the city from liability for its negli-,
gent maintenance of the street. The court cited and approved the statement:
of Wharton quoted above and seemingly overlooked the fact that the do&-;
trine there announced is contrary to the line of Pennsylvania cases cited
above, none of which were referred to in the opinion. In fact the opinion
did not cite a single Pennsylvania case dealing with intervening human neg-
ligence.
Unless the motorist's intervening negligence can be looked upon as
highly extraordinary, this case is also contra to the rule stated in Section 447
of the Restatement of Torts. There can be no doubt that the defendant mu-
nicipality did breach a duty owed to the plaintiff, and was therefore negli-
gent toward him, by permitting the hole to remain in the highway for months,
The duty of the municipality is not merely to acquaint travelers with the
condition of the highway,-it is to exercise reasonable care to keep the high-
way in repair and safe for travel. There are numerous familiar decisions
which have permitted travelers knowingly using dangerous highways to re-
cover for harm suffered in the course of such use.29 Consequently, it cannot
be said that the fact that the motorist in the Stone case knew of the existence
of the highway defect should in itself have relieved the municipality from
liability. It is submitted that reasonable men could well find in the Stone
case (and the jury had found for the plaintiff against the city) that the de-
fect in the street was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's
harm. Undoubtedly the conduct of the intervening motorist was also a
substantial factor. If his conduct was negligent, he should be subject to lia-
bility for harm caused thereby. But that is no reason for relieving another
tortfeasor of liability. It seems to the present writer that it is going very
far to state arbitrarily that no reasonable man could find as a fact that the
hole in the street was not a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's
harm. Certainly the average bystander who happened to see the automobile
wheel strike the hole, and thereafter lunge forward out of control and hit the
plaintiff, would feel that the presence of the hole had played an important
part in causing the accident. If it be argued that the act of the motorist was
a cause but for which the accident would not have happened, the same can be
said about the hole. If it be admitted as a fact that a causal relationship did
exist between the hole and the plaintiff's harm, then the Stone case should be
viewed from the standpoint of the question, Is there any sound public policy
which justifies a rule of law which exculpates from liability an admitted
wrongdoer merely because a second wrongdoer has intervened and assisted
in causing the plaintiff's harm? Or stated in other words, Should an admit-
29. See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, PA. ANNOT. (1938) § 473, comment b.
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ted wrongdoer who has caused harm succeed in avoiding payment therefor
-merely because of the existence of another wrongdoer who may or may not
be, and who frequently is not, financially responsible? If so, it would seem
that the law is putting a premium upon prompt wrongdoing by rewarding
the first wrongdoer with freedom from liability and penalizing the sluggardly
wrongdoer, who does not enter the picture until later, by putting the whole
responsibility upon him.
The Stone case was almost immediately followed by Hoffman v. McKees-
port,30 which, without discussion, followed the rule announced in the Stone
case.31 The rule that an intervening negligent act operates as a superseding
cause was also announced, by way of dictum, in Welser v. United Gas Im-
provement Co. 8 2 It was reiterated in Helmick v. South Union Twp.,'3 in
which the township was negligent in not guarding the roadside over which
a'negligently operated truck plunged, killing three passengers. The vehicle
skidded on mud on the highway, and there is no statement in the opinion
that the driver knew of the danger in time to avert the accident by the then
use of reasonable care.3 4 The rule was also reiterated in Schwartz v. Jaffe,35
in which, although the intervening negligent motorist knew the road was un-
der construction, he had no knowledge of the particular depression which
was struck; and in Murray v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co.,86 in which the Restate-
ment was cited, although the charge of the court, approved in the opinion,
was directly contra to the rule theie stated.
On the other hand, in Fehrs v. McKeesport," in which innocent inter-
vening human action was involved, the court said, approvingly, "In 22 R. C.
L. 129, it is said: 'In other words, where a defendant is guilty of negligence,
which causes an injury, and the plaintiff is free from negligence contributing
30. 3o3 Pa. 548, 154 Ati. 925 (1931).
31. In view of the reliance placed upon Wharton's views of causation, it is interesting to
note that three weeks after the Hoffman case the court decided Grodstein v. McGivern, 303
Pa. 555, 154 AtI. 794 (193i), which practically overruled Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21
AUt. 244 (i8gi). See RESTATEmENT, ToRTs, PA. ANNOT. (938) § 385. The latter case had
also relied upon and followed Wharton's theory of causation as applied to the liability of a
contractor to a person not in privity of contract with him.
32. 304 Pa. 227, 155 Atl. 561 (931).
33. 323 Pa. 433, 185 AtI. 609 (1936).
34. The effect of this decision is to limit the passengers to an action against the bus
operator. It is interesting to note that this achieves the same result as that reached in the
now thoroughly discredited case of Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. 151 (1863). There
the defendant had negligently piled barrels too close to a railroad track. The plaintiff's car-
rier thereafter negligently ran into them, harming the plaintiff. The court held that the
plaintiff's sole remedy was against his carrier. So too, the effect of the decision in the Hel-
mick case is the same as though the court had applied the exploded theory of imputed neg-
ligence and had held that the bus driver's contributory negligence barred the passenger's
recovery against the negligent township. The plaintiffs in the Helmick case can comfort
themselves with the thought that though they were denied recovery it was not based on these
long discarded rules.
35. 324 Pa. 324, 188 AtI. 295 (1936).
36. 324 Pa. 486, 188 At. 19o (1936).
37. 318 Pa. 279, 178 AtI. 38o (1935).
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thereto, the fact that the negligence of a third person also contributed does
not relieve the defendant from liability for his negligence'." 38 Also, in
Darrah v. Wilkinsburg Hotel Co.,89 which involved innocent intervening
human conduct, the court approvingly quoted the entire black letter of Sec-
tion 447 of the Restatement of Torts. The dicta in the latter two cases in-
dicate a view which is inconsistent with the Stone case, and which is contrary
to the statement in Wharton upon which the Stone case is based. The same
view was followed in Murtha v. Phiadelphia,40 and Anderson v. Supplee-
Wills-Jones Milk Co.,41 in both of which cases intervening negligent human
action, which does not appear in the retrospect to have been extraordinary,
was held not to be a superseding cause.
Another line of cases also developed following the Stone case, in which
plaintiffs were permitted to recover although independent intervening neg-
ligent action by responsible human beings appeared. In these cases the Su-
preme Court repeatedly held, without any discussion of the causal question,
and without any reference to the Stone case, that the negligent operation of
an automobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger did not relieve from lia-
bility a defendant who had negligently left an unlighted automobile truck
parked on the highway. Among these cases, Janeway v. Lafferty Bros.42 is
difficult to reconcile on its facts with Schwartz v. Jaffe.43 This line of cases
is fully cited in Kline v. Moyer,44 in which the court definitely restricts the
rule of the Stone case to an intervening act of negligence committed after the
intervening actor has become aware of the danger created by the defendant's
antecedent negligence. In this case the court holds that an intervening neg-
ligent act is not a superseding cause, unless the intervening actor, having
actual knowledge of the potential danger, thereafter acts in a manner which
is unreasonably dangerous.4"
The opinion in Kline v. Moyer does not refer to Burrell Twp. v. Un-
capher,4" Koelsch. v. Philadelphia Co.,47 or Trusty v. Patterson,48 in all of
which cases plaintiffs were permitted to recover although the intervening
negligent act had been committed after the intervener had actual knowledge
of the potential danger created by the defendant's negligent conduct. It is
consequently difficult, if not impossible, to state with precision the present
38. Id. at 282, 178 Atl. at 381.
39. 318 Pa. 511, 178 Atl. 669 (1935).
40. 112 Pa. Super. 426, 7i Atl. 399 (1934).
41. i19 Pa. Super. 386, 181 Atl. 368 (1935).
42. 323 Pa. 324, I85 Atl. 827 (1936).
43. 324 Pa. 324, I88 At. 295 (936).
44. 325 Pa. 357, 191 AtI. 43 (1937).
45. Cf. Helmick v. South Union Twp., 323 Pa. 433, 185 Atl. 6og (1937), in which lia-
bility was denied although it does not appear from the opinion whether the intervening actor
knew of the danger in time to avert the accident by the then use of reasonable care.
46. 117 Pa. 353, 1I Atl. 61g (887).
47. 152 Pa. 355, 25 Atl. 522 (1893).
48. 299 Pa. 469, 149 Atl. 717 (1930).
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Pennsylvania law as to how far intervening negligent human conduct consti-
tutes a superseding cause. The rule laid down in Kline v. Moyer appears
to take the view that intervening acts which are "ordinary negligence" are
not superseding causes, but that the latter consist only of continued negligent
action in the face of a known danger. Such continued action in the face of
a known danger is what the Pennsylvania cases dealing with trespassers on
land have referred to as "wilful or wanton". 49 There appears, therefore, to
be at least an intimation in Kline v. Moyer that an "ordinary" intervening
negligent act is not a superseding cause, while that which the Pennsylvania
courts have called a "wilful or wanton" intervening act is. In other words,
only the latter kind of act may be deemed "extraordinarily negligent", and
not foreseeable, while the former may be deemed a "normal response to a
situation which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in creat-
ing",50 for the results of which the actor should be subject to liability.5 1
As has been said, the decision in Kline v. Moyer appears quite definitely
to restrict the broad rule laid down in the Stone case. Just how far
the court intended to go is made difficult to determine by the fact that almost
immediately after that decision the court handed down the decision
in Maguire v. Doughty.52 This case is quite distinguishable from Kline v.
Moyer on its facts, but the opinion, without referring to the Kline case, said,
by way of dictum: "In Hoffman v. McKeesport . this court held that
if a party do an act which might naturally produce an injury to another, but,
before any such injury results, a third person does some act or omits to per-
form some act which it was his duty to perform, and this act or omission of
such third person is the immediate cause of an injury, which would not have
occurred but for his negligence, the third person is responsible for the injury
and not the party guilty of the first negligence; for the causal con-
nection between the first act of negligence and the injury is broken by the
intervention of the act or omission of the third party." 53 The quoted
language announces an even more stringent doctrine of superseding
cause than the now generally discarded last human wrongdoer rule. It not
only states the last human wrongdoer rule without the limitation drawn in
Kline v. Moyer, but further states that where a third person "omits to per-
form some act which it was his duty to perform", such omission may con-
stitute a superseding cause. On the other hand, the well-nigh universal rule
49. Cover v. Hershey Transit Co., 290 Pa. 551, 139 Atl. 266 (1927) ; Peden v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. P-, 324 Pa. 444, 188 Atl. 586 (I936) ; Reagan v. Reading Co., 126 Pa. Super. 175,
i9o Atl. 412 (1937). For full citation of cases see RESTATEMENT, TORTS, P. ANNOT. (1938)
§ 336, comment d.
5o. RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1934) § 447, comment f.
5r. With the distinction stated by the court in Klhne v. Moyer, compare RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1934) § 466, comment g, distinguishing between a plaintiff's "casual negligence" and
his "assumption of risk".
52. 326 Pa. 122, 191 AtI. 348 (1937).
53. Id. at 127, x9i Atl. at 350.
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has been formulated in the Restatement to be "failure of a third person to
perform a duty owing to another to protect him from harm threatened by the
actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of the other's harm." 5'
In view of the recent attitude of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
with relation to intervening negligent acts, it is curious to note that in a num-
ber of cases the Pennsylvania courts have held that an intervening criminal
act does not necessarily constitute a superseding cause. 55 In two cases in
particular, the Superior Court has held that the intervening criminal act of
stealing an automobile did not relieve the proprietor of the parking lot or
garage from liability. 56 In the one case the court said, "If an intervening
act which ought to have been foreseen, contributes to the original negligence,
the original wrongdoer will not be excused; his negligence remains the direct
cause of the loss." 57
In the opinion of the writer it is to be hoped that the statement just
quoted will become the prevailing rule in Pennsylvania. There is no sound
basis for the further survival of the last human wrongdoer rule as applied to
intervening negligent acts. The decision in Kline v. Moyer is a step forward
in at least limiting the further application of this doctrine. The decisions of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania prior to Stone v. Philadelphia afford
ample authority to enable the court to accept fully the rule stated in Section
447 of the Restatement. In addition, this section has already been cited with
approval by the Supreme Court in three recent decisions,55 so that the court
is in a position, if it sees fit so to do, to accept the Restatement rule com-
pletely.
Of course, in a case in which the intervening action so dominates the
situation as to be the sole substantial cause of the harm which follows, the
defendant's antecedent negligence is not a cause at all, as a matter of fact,
and the defendant cannot be held liable for the plaintiff's harm, and this is so
whether the intervening act be culpable or innocent. But where the defend-
ant's negligence is in fact a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's
harm, the additional fact that some intervening negligent act is likewise a
substantial factor should not relieve the defendant from liability under ordi-
nary circumstances.
There will be occasional cases in which the intervening negligence is so
unusual, and the nature of the harm which has been caused is so unlikely, that
54. RESTA=TExT, TORTS (1934) §452.
55. See RESTATEmENT, TORTS, PA. ANNOT. (1938) §§ 448, 449.
56. Baione v. Heavey, lO3 Pa. Super. 529, 158 AtI. 181 (1932) ; Smith v. Cohen, 116 Pa.
Super. 395, 176 Ad. 869 (935).
57. Id. at 398, 176 At. at 87o. The court also quoted with approval the statement that
"if, at the time of the original negligence, the criminal act could have been foreseen, the causal
chain is not broken by the intervening criminal act." Ibid.
58. Darrah v. Wilkinsburg Hotel Co., 318 Pa. 511, 178 At. 669 (1935); Murray v.
Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 324 Pa. 486, 188 AtI. i9o (1936) ; Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 191Aft. 43 (1937).
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the court's sense of justice will be shocked at the thought of asking the de-
fendant to respond for the injury. Such a case is provided for in the cited
section of the Restatement. There is no reason of policy, however, why the
court should not view realistically the foreseeability of negligent intervention
in the average case. The problem is quite different from that which con-
fronts the court in determining whether a litigant has been guilty of negli-
gence or contributory negligence. In passing upon the question of a mo-
torist's negligence the Pennsylvania courts have said again and again that a
person is not required to anticipate that other persons will act negligently.
The same rule has been announced in passing upon the contributory negli-
gence of motorists. 59 There is a sound basis for this rule, "since motor traf-
fic would be unreasonably delayed unless motorists were permitted to act on
such assumptions." 60 Furthermore, the defense of contributory negligence is
at best a harsh one, particularly as administered in Pennsylvania. Any rule
which mitigates the severity of the defense of contributory negligence has
desirable social reasons to support it. In passing upon the question of con-
tributory negligence the court may well say, for reasons of policy, that a mo-
torist is not required to anticipate negligent conduct from another motorist
until he actually sees him being negligent, even though it is a matter of com-
mon knowledge that enormous numbers of motorists are negligent every day
in the year. On the other hand, there is no sound public policy which re-
quires us to close our eyes to realities when considering the question of super-
seding cause. In such a case we are dealing with a man who is admittedly a
wrongdoer, who has admittedly violated a duty which was created to protect
the plaintiff from the harm which he has suffered. We are dealing with a
man whose breach of duty to the plaintiff has been found to be a substantial
factor in causing the plaintiff's harm. Normally the plaintiff is entitled to
have such a man pay for it. Under such circumstances the intervening neg-
ligence should be extraordinary indeed before the defendant is permitted to
escape from liability.
It is the settled policy of the law that the burden of the financial aspects
of the plaintiff's loss should be lifted from his shoulders. The practical
effect of the "last human wrongdoer" rule is to defeat this policy in many
cases. The intervening negligent person may be unknown or beyond the
reach of process. Frequently he is financially irresponsible. Why should the
original wrongdoer bask in the protective warmth and financial security of
an outmoded and artificial rule, while an innocent and injured plaintiff car-
ries the burden of a loss which he had no part in producing but which the
exculpated wrongdoer most certainly had?
59. See RESTATEmENT, TORTS, PA. ANNOT. (1938) § 302, comment e, § 290, comment b.
6o. RESTATEMENT, TORTs (1934) § 302, comment e.
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(Opinions will naturally differ as to what sort of intervening human neg-
ligence is extraordinary or not expectable. In Kline v. Moyer the court took
the position that it is not unexpectable for a motorist to be negligent in driv-
ing his automobile in such a way as to be unable to stop within the assured
clear distance ahead; 61 but that it is unexpectable, and would constitute a
superseding cause, if the motorist after having knowledge of an obstruction
in the road fails to exercise a then existing ability to avoid, by the exercise of
due care, swerving to the other side of the highway and striking another
car. However, there does not appear to be any great fundamental difference
between that type of negligence which consists of inattention to one's sur-
roundings so that the danger is not perceived in time to avoid it, and that type
of negligence which consists of a failure to measure up to the standard of the
reasonable man in taking proper steps to avoid an observed danger. It seems
to be just as foreseeable that a person who sees a danger may be negligent in
becoming more rattled, or in having a slower reaction time, than a reasonable
man, as that a person may be negligent in failing to notice the danger in time
to avert harm. In any event, there are at present numerous open questions in
Pennsylvania as to the exact extent to which culpable human intervention
constitutes a superseding cause, the answers to which must await future de-
cisions of the appellate courts.
6r. It is settled in Pennsylvania that this is negligence per se. See RESTATE MET, TORTS,
PA. AxxoT. (1938) § 285, comment d, for full citation of cases.
